Could an artificial intelligence ever be conscious, and what should the law do if it were? This book brings the philosophy of mind, the science of consciousness, artificial intelligence research and legal analysis together to answer a question that courts and legislatures can no longer postpone.
It begins with consciousness itself: how the concept developed, why its definition remains contested, and what the leading scientific theories agree on. It then examines computational functionalism, the premise on which any possibility of AI consciousness depends, and the systems that exist today, from narrow tools to the general and superintelligent AI systems now being planned. Drawing on the latest evidence from inside large language models, including the consciousness and welfare assessments an AI developer has published, it asks what that evidence does and does not show about artificial consciousness.
The legal chapters take up legal personhood, AI rights, obligations and liability, and compare how legal systems have responded. Most, the EU AI Act among them, regulate AI as a product and stay silent on its status. Some American states deny AI legal personhood by statute. For animals, the United Kingdom, the European Union and the Constitutional Court of Ecuador have taken a third course, recognising sentience on structured scientific evidence without waiting for proof. The book argues that this third course offers the standard AI regulation will need, and closes with recommendations for AI companies and governments.
Written for lawyers, policymakers, researchers and students in law, philosophy and AI, this book offers a clear guide to one of the defining legal questions of the coming decades.